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COMMENT
NOT QUITE A FAMILY:
THE SECOND CIRCUIT DECIDES AGAINST
RECOGNIZING PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS FOR A PRE-ADOPTIVE FOSTER FAMILY
IN RODRIGUEZ V. McLOUGHLIN*
INTRODUCTION
The foster parent has evolved from acting solely as a
temporary parent to representing, in many cases, a child's best
hope for a stable and permanent family. The federal
government recognized this fact in the Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997 ("ASFA"). ASFA sought to achieve
"permanent placement" for children through state foster care
programs.' In addition, states such as New York have created
statutory provisions that grant preferred status to the foster
parent in adoption proceedings.! Despite this development,
both state and federal courts have shown a general reluctance
to award constitutional protection for the foster parent, even in
cases where the biological parents' rights have been terminated
and the foster parent has initiated adoption proceedings.' The
Supreme Court, in the case of Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality and Reform ("OFFER"), declined to
directly comment on whether a foster parent should expect due
process rights with respect to the care and custody of a foster
* 02002 Katherine S. Wilson. All Rights Reserved.
142 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(E)(ii) (1997).
2 N.Y. SOC. SERv. LAW § 383(3) (McKinney 1992).
3 See Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, 214 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 2000) [hereinafter
Rodriguez III.
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child.4 However, the Court in OFFER hinted at the possibility
of due process rights for long-term foster parents due to the
relationship that emerges over time through "mutual care and
support."'
Lower federal courts remain divided on how to interpret
the OFFER decision.6 In the case of Rodriguez v. McLoughlin,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ("Second Circuit")
ruled that a foster mother, biologically unrelated to her four-
year-old foster child for whom she had cared since his infancy,
did not possess a liberty interest in the preservation of her
family.7 Further, the court held that, notwithstanding that the
biological parents' rights had long since been terminated and
that petitioner Rodriguez had signed an agreement to adopt
the child, the relevant New York statutory provisions did not
afford her procedural due process.8 This Comment agrees that
New York law does not create a liberty interest. However, the
court's decision is problematic because it fails to adequately
address the issue of whether a liberty interest might arise
under the Due Process Clause. In so doing, the court
misinterpreted the OFFER decision. The Second Circuit should
have concluded that the relationship between Ms. Rodriguez
and the child was similar enough to that of a constitutionally-
protected family to be guaranteed procedural due process.
Finding a liberty interest in a pre-adoptive foster family would
not jeopardize the state's responsibility to protect foster
children. The Second Circuit's decision in Rodriguez
' Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S.
816 (1977) [hereinafter OFFER].
5 Rivera v. Marcus, 696 F.2d 1016, 1024 (2d Cir. 1982) (footnote omitted)
(citing OFFER, 431 U.S. at 844).
See Procopio v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1993); Wildauer v. Frederick
County, 993 F.2d 369 (4th Cir. 1993); Lipscomb v. Simmons, 884 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir.
1989); Spielman v. Hildebrand, 873 F.2d 1377 (10th Cir. 1989); Rivera v. Marcus, 696
F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1982); Kyees v. County Dep't of Pub. Welfare of Tippecanoe County,
600 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1979); Thelen v. Catholic Soc. Servs., 691 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D.
Wis. 1988); Brown v. County of San Joaquin, 601 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
7 Rodriguez II, 214 F.3d at 341.8 Id.
9 Note that this Comment discusses the impact of the Second Circuit's decision
on a particular class of foster families possessing characteristics like those of the
Rodriguez foster family. Characteristics include the termination status of biological
parents' rights, the foster parent's pre-adoptive status, and the psychological bonds
between foster parent and child.
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authorizes agencies to completely disregard the strong
emotional ties between a pre-adoptive foster mother and
child.10
I. BACKGROUND
A. Rodriguez v. McLoughlin
In Rodriguez, Ms. Rodriguez, a foster parent, sued
several city agencies and Cardinal McCloskey Children's and
Family Services ("McCloskey"), a private family services
organization, for damages stemming from the temporary
removal of a foster child, Andrew, from her home.1 Ms.
Rodriguez alleged three due process violations in her
complaint.' First, Ms. Rodriguez claimed the circumstances of
the foster home did not render necessary an emergency
removal; thus, defendants denied Ms. Rodriguez notice and a
pre-removal hearing.13 Second, defendants did not allow Ms.
Rodriguez a fair hearing to contest the removal, nor did
defendants provide her with sufficient post-removal notice. 4
10 Refusing to guarantee procedural protection to a pre-adoptive foster family
in the event the agency removes the child jeopardizes the potential for a pre-adoptive
foster parent to build strong emotional bonds with her child.
"
1 Rodriguez II, 214 F.3d at 333. McCloskey was a foster care agency
authorized by the City of New York. See infra note 17.12 Rodriguez II, 214 F.3d at 333.
'3Id. The district court dismissed the first claim after finding the
circumstances justified the emergency removal.14 Id. In a non-emergency removal situation, the authorized agency (here,
McCloskey) must notify the foster parents in writing of the intention to remove the
child. The notice must be given at least ten days prior to the proposed removal effective
date except in cases where the health or safety of the child mandates the child's
immediate removal. Notification must inform the foster parents that they may request
a conference, a pre-removal review with the appropriate social services official at which
they are entitled to a review of the reasons for removal (called an Independent Review
in New York City). See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 443.5 (1999). See also
Brief for Municipal Appellants at 8, Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, 214 F.3d 328 (2d Cir.
2000) (No. 99-7020). The foster parents may submit reasons at such conference to
demonstrate why the child should not be removed. If the foster parents request the
conference, the social services official must set a time and place for the conference
within ten days of receipt of such request and must send written notice of the
conference to the foster parents. The social services official's decision as to whether the
removal must happen must be rendered and issued within five days. The official must
20021
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Third, defendants denied Ms. Rodriguez visitation rights and
refused her request to protest the ruling.15
Andrew's biological mother abandoned Andrew
immediately following his birth in 1990.16 Defendants placed
Andrew into the foster home of Ms. Rodriguez thirteen days
later.17 A family court terminated the parental rights of
Andrew's biological mother on June 25, 1993.8 Custody of
Andrew was then transferred to defendant McCloskey. On
August 9, 1993, Ms. Rodriguez and McCloskey entered into an
Adoptive Placement Agreement.' 9 At the time of the removal,
the parties were awaiting the culmination of the adoption
finalization procedures.2"
send a written notice to the foster parents informing them (and their counsel, if any) of
the decision, their right to appeal and their right to request a Fair Hearing conducted
by the state pursuant to § 400 of New York's Social Services Law. See 18 N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. § 443.5(c).
In Rodriguez, McCloskey determined the situation appropriate for an
emergency removal. See Rodriguez II, 214 F.3d at 332. The procedures for an
emergency removal are not clearly outlined in New York's regulatory provisions. See 18
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. § 443.5. Section 443.5 removes the initial ten-day notice
requirement in the event the health or safety of the child requires immediate removal
but does not specifically set out procedures to be followed after an emergency removal
(i.e., whether post-removal notice is required, and what should be contained in such
notice). See id.
", Rodriguez II, 214 F. 3d at 332.
'6 Andrew was an out-of-wedlock child whose father was never named. See
Brief for Municipal Appellants, supra note 14, at 6 n.2.
17 See Rodriguez II, 214 F.3d at 331. At the time of this case, McCloskey was
an authorized foster care agency for the City of New York, which gave it the legal
ability to "care'for, to place out or to board out children." See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §
371(10)(a) (McKinney 1992).
"a See Rodriguez II, 214 F.3d at 331.
'9 Andrew's adoption is called an "agency adoption." In an agency adoption, the
natural parent's rights have already been terminated. The authorized foster care
agency has legal custody of the child. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 112 (3) (McKinney
Supp. 1999). The Adoption Placement Agreement between McCloskey and Ms.
Rodriguez was a standard New York State one-page form agreement. In the
agreement, Ms. Rodriguez acknowledged that she was taking Andrew "with the
intention of adoption although [she understood] that legal custody remains with ...
McCloskey and that this . . . agreement remains in effect until the date of legal
adoption." Ms. Rodriguez further agreed that
if at any time prior to legal adoption it is determined by the agency or
by [herself] that the child should be removed from [her] home, [Ms.
Rodriguez] will cooperate with the agency in carrying this out in a way
that serves the best interest of the child in the judgment of the agency.
Rodriguez II, 214 F.3d at 331.
20 McCloskey reported to the New York Child Welfare Administration ("CWA")
in November of 1993 that its new plan for Andrew was to complete Ms. Rodriguez'
[Vol. 67: 3
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On March 18, 1994, a McCloskey case planner made a
scheduled visit to Ms. Rodriguez' home. Ms. Rodriguez was not
at home because she was attending a court appointment
regarding custody of her then twelve-year-old grandson,
Edwin.21 Upon arrival to the Rodriguez home, the case planner
discovered that no supervising adult was present. Instead,
Edwin apparently was left to watch over Andrew and Thomas,
another foster child.' The case planner determined that Edwin
seemed to be having difficulty managing the children.'
Immediately, the case planner contacted his supervisor who
instructed him to remove the two foster children from the
home. 4
. On April 1, 1994, Rodriguez requested a fair hearing
before the State Department of Social Services ("State DSS")
and an Independent Review by the Child Welfare
Administration ("CWA").' During investigation of the matter,
Ms. Rodriguez requested a visit with Andrew. McCloskey
denied her request pending a determination of whether
adoption. All the necessary paperwork for adoption was filed before the removal in
1994. See Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, 49 F. Supp. 2d 186, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
[hereinafter Rodriguez 1]. However, a special adoption subsidy still required approval
before the adoption application could be submitted to the court. Rodriguez II, 214 F.3d
at 332.
21 Edwin also lived with Ms. Rodriguez at the time the removal took place.
Rodriguez II, 214 F.3d at 332.
= Thomas was three years old on the removal date. Ms. Rodriguez was not
planning to adopt Thomas. In fact, Thomas was scheduled to be placed in an adoptive
home later that month. Ms. Rodriguez claimed that she had arranged for a neighbor to
baby-sit, however, no adult was present during the time the case planner was there.
Id. The district court found Ms. Rodriguez was in violation of regulations requiring
that an adult must be present at all times. See Brief for Appellees at 9, Rodriguez v.
McLoughlin, 214 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 2000) (No. 99-7020).
According to the Municipal Appellant's brief, Edwin was an emotionally
handicapped special education student. See Brief for Municipal Appellants, supra note
14 at 6. Appellee Rodriguez pointed out in her brief that McCloskey had confirmed that
Edwin was a "bright child who demonstrated the ability to perform above average on
an intellectual basis." See Brief for Appellees, supra note 22, at 9. Rodriguez also
claimed Edwin was "known to be very capable of feeding, bathing, and otherwise
caring for Andrew and Thomas." Id.
2' Thomas and Andrew were then transferred to a new foster home.
McCloskey filed a Report of Suspected Child Abuse or Maltreatment with the New
York State Department of Social Services, which in turn triggered an investigation by
the CWA's Office of Confidential Investigations. Rodriguez II, 214 F.3d at 332.




visitation would be in Andrew's best interests." McCloskey did
not permit Ms. Rodriguez to visit Andrew until June 27, 1994.27
Meanwhile, on April 19, 1994, the CWA's Office of Confidential
Investigations ("OCI") determined that there was not sufficient
evidence to establish child maltreatment. OCI sent its report
to McCloskey on June 20.29 CWA issued its Decision After
Independent Review on July 11,30 ordering McCloskey to return
Andrew to Ms. Rodriguez."' McCloskey returned Andrew to Ms.
Rodriguez on July 13.2 Ms. Rodriguez' adoption of Andrew was
finalized in August 1995. 33 In March 1996, Ms. Rodriguez
brought the present action in United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§1983 on behalf of herself and Andrew.34
At trial, defendants moved to dismiss each of Ms.
Rodriguez' complaints.3 5 The district court granted in part and
denied in part the motions. 6 The court dismissed Ms.
Rodriguez' claim that Andrew's emergency removal was
unjustifiable. 7 However, the court held that Ms. Rodriguez had
a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in her relationship with her
prospective adoptive and foster child, Andrew, at the time he
was removed from her home.38 As such, the court found that




29 Rodriguez II, 214 F.3d at 332.
30 Id.
31!d.
12 Id. at 333.
3Id.
34 Rodriguez II, 214 F.3d at 333.
31 Id. at 333.
36 Rodriguez 1, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 208.
37 The court ruled, "[als long as there is an objective basis for fear of imminent
injury to the children, it is not the role of the court... to second-guess, with the benefit
of hindsight, the case worker's and foster agency officials' on-the-spot determination to
remove a child left without adult supervision." Id.
38 Id. at 199. The district court noted that its holding "recognizes such a liberty
interest in only a discretely identifiable set of foster parents." Id. A foster parent
qualifies if (1) the foster child's biological parents' parental rights have been
terminated; (2) the foster parent has cared for the child for at least twelve months




opportunity to be heard to contest the action was unreasonable,
and therefore, defendants violated Ms. Rodriguez' right to
procedural due process."
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's
decision.4' The Second Circuit held that Ms. Rodriguez and
Andrew did not have a liberty interest under the Due Process
Clause in their relationship at the time of Andrew's removal.4'
The court concluded that a liberty interest would arise only
under state law, and not under the Fourteenth Amendment.42
The court found, however, that the relevant New York statutes
and regulations did not afford Ms. Rodriguez or Andrew a
liberty interest.43 Further, the court refused to recognize that a
liberty interest was created when Rodriguez and McCloskey
entered into an Adoptive Placement Agreement." Ms.
Rodriguez appealed her case to the Supreme Court of the
United States. On May 29, 2001, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 
45
B. Prior Case Law
The Rodriguez case considers the question of what
belongs within the definition of "family" for purposes of
granting constitutional protection. For much of American
history, the Supreme Court refused to extend the reach of the
Due Process Clause beyond the biological family. Beginning in
the second half of the twentieth century, the Court began
stretching the concept of family to encompass other, less
traditional familial structures.46
39 Rodriguez 1, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 205-06. The court denied defendants' motion
to dismiss based on a qualified immunity claim. Id. at 208.
"* Rodriguez II, 214 F.3d at 341-42.
41 Id. at 341.
42 Id. at 337-38.
43 Id. at 341.
"Id.
45 Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, 121 S. Ct. 2192 (2001).
46 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (finding that
extended family members could possess liberty interests in the preservation of family);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that unwed father had a due process
right to a fair hearing before children could be taken away in a dependency
proceeding). The Court has also established certain individual rights that are of "basic
importance." M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996). These rights concern choices
relating to marriage, raising children, and family life. The Court has affirmed as
20021
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In the 1970s, two Supreme Court cases established the
principle that family rights extend beyond the constraints of
the nuclear family. In 1972, the Court held in Stanley v.
Illinois that an unwed father did have a due process right to a
fair hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children
(whose mother had died) could be taken from him.' In Stanley,
the Court emphasized that the family unit is of fundamental
importance." Therefore, the right to bear and raise children is
among the most essential civil rights.49 In addition, the Court
pointed out that the law recognizes families that are not united
by marriage, noting that children in less traditional families
"cannot be denied the right of other children because familial
bonds in such cases were often as warm, enduring, and
important as those arising within a more formally organized
family unit."' In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Supreme
Court found a city ordinance that limited occupancy to
members of a single family unconstitutional.5' Holding that due
process rights do not end at the boundary of the nuclear family,
the Court determined that extended family members could also
possess liberty interests in the protection of a family's
sanctity.52
Despite its willingness to recognize the due process
rights of unwed fathers and extended family members, the
Supreme Court has not yet decided whether a foster parent has
a similar liberty interest either under the Due Process Clause
recently as 1996 that the Fourteenth Amendment protects individual's freedom of
choice against unwanted State interference. See id. at 116; see also Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).4
1 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657-58.4
1Id. at 651.49 Id.
ro Id. at 652 (citing Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968)).
5'Moore, 431 U.S. at 503-04.
" Id. at 504-05. It should be noted that while the Supreme Court has
not recognized due process rights in "psychological families," where there are not
biological ties, some state courts have. See Phillip B. v. Warren B., 188 Cal. Rptr. 781
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that non-parents were properly found to have
established a psychological or "de facto" parental relationship with a mentally disabled
child, even though the child had not resided with them on a full time basis. The court
ruled that the child's biological parents did not have such an emotional attachment to
the child and thus should not have custody); Berhow v. Crow, 423 So. 2d 372, 374 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (noting that the relationship with between foster parents and child
covered nearly all of child's life).
[Vol. 67: 3
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or in the context of state law.53 In the 1977 OFFER case, a
group of foster parents alleged due process violations with
respect to New York statutory procedures involving the
removal of foster children.' The Supreme Court deemed it
unnecessary to confront the due process question, reasoning
that even if the foster parents in OFFER possessed liberty
interests, the statutory provisions were constitutionally
sound.55 In the twenty-three years since the Court decided
OFFER, the lower federal courts have split as to how to apply
OFFER to the issue of whether foster parents should receive
due process protection."
One line of cases has interpreted OFFER as suggesting
that foster parents possess a liberty interest in the
preservation of the foster family.57 These cases point out that in
OFFER, the Supreme Court recognized that "biological
relationships are not the exclusive determination of the
existence of a family."58 While this line of cases does not seem
3 To establish a claim of procedural due process, a plaintiff must first
demonstrate that he or she possesses a constitutionally protected "interest," such as
the interest in preserving the sanctity of the family unit. See, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. at
504-05. See also Thelen, 691 F. Supp. at 1183 (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 569 (1972)). The interest must fall within the meaning of "liberty" or "property"
under the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, or may include
interests recognized and protected by state law. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466
(1983).
See OFFER, 431 U.S. at 819-22.
55Id.
See Procopio v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding foster parents
did not possess a liberty interest); Wildauer v. Frederick County, 993 F.2d 369 (4th
Cir. 1993) (holding foster parents did not possess a liberty interest); Spielman v.
Hildebrand, 873 F.2d 1377 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that while foster parents
possessed a liberty interest, the procedures for removal did not violate due process);
Kyees v. County Dep't of Pub. Welfare of Tippecanoe County, 600 F.2d 693 (7th Cir.
1979) (holding foster parents did not possess a liberty interest); but see Rivera v.
Marcus, 696 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding foster parent possessed a liberty
interest); Thelen v. Catholic Soc. Servs., 691 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D. Wis. 1988) (holding
foster parents did possess a liberty interest); Brown v. County of San Joaquin, 601 F.
Supp. 653 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (holding foster parents did possess a liberty interest).
57 See Rivera, 696 F.2d at 1024 (foster parent was the half-sister of foster
children); Thelen, 691 F. Supp. at 1186 (pre-adoptive parents); Brown, 601 F Supp. at
665 (foster child had lived in the foster home for over three years and never knew his
real parents).
See Rivera, 696 F.2d at 1024 (noting that OFFER, "suggested in dicta that
long term foster parents may be entitled to some due process protection in light of the
relationships developed through mutual care and support."); Brown, 601 F. Supp. at
665 (noting the OFFER cours point that "biological relationships are not the exclusive
20021
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to present a uniform set of criteria for establishing a liberty
interest, each indicates that the OFFER case did not rule out a
foster parent possessing a liberty interest. For example, in
Brown v. San Joaquin, the District Court for the Eastern
District of California held that foster parents had a liberty
interest that could not be deprived without due process.59 The
Brown court noted that in OFFER, the Supreme Court
"identifle[d] the role of the state in the creation of the [foster
family] as a 'consideration,' a distinction between biological
families and foster families, but not necessarily a dispositive
difference."0 The court also cited OFFER as acknowledging the
possibility of due process protection arising between foster
parents and a child who has lived with them since infancy, has
stayed for several years, and has never known his or her
biological parents.61
According to this reasoning, the State's continued
supervisory role in the foster relationship thus does not
preclude a liberty interest arising either under the Due Process
Clause or under state law.62 The Supreme Court in OFFER,
however, indicated that the State's role in the foster care
system is significant.63 The Court warned that "whatever
emotional ties . . . develop between foster parent and foster
determination of the existence of a family).
69 Brown, 601 F. Supp. at 662. The state of California had denied the foster
parents' adoption application. Id.
60 Id. at 665 (quoting OFFER, 431 U.S. at 845).6, Id. The Supreme Court noted in OFFER,
At least where a child has been place in foster care as an infant, has
never known his natural parents, and has remained continuously for
several years in the care of the same foster parents, it is natural that
the foster family should hold the same place in the emotional life of
the foster child, and fulfill the same socializing functions, as a natural
family.
OFFER, 431 U.S. at 844.
62 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (regarding the state's
authorization of a foster care agency).
"See OFFER, 431 U.S. at 845. Indeed, the State, either through its own
children services agency or through a private agency that has been authorized by the
State to initiate and regulate foster care arrangements, retains legal custody of foster
children until they have been reunified with their natural parents or are adopted. See,
e.g., Rodriguez II, 214 F.3d at 340-41. Nevertheless, cases such as Brown have found a
liberty interest to exist in certain foster families, notwithstanding the State's power to
terminate a foster care relationship at any time. See McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 876 F.2d
308 (3d Cir. 1989); Rivera, 696 F.2d at 1024; Thelen, 691 F. Supp. at 1186; Brown, 601
F. Supp. at 665.
[VCol. 67:3
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child have their origins in an arrangement where the State has
been a partner from the outset."' Nevertheless, courts since
OFFER have held that certain foster families do have due
process rights despite the State's involvement. 5 In Brown, the
major factors pointing toward a liberty interest included: (1)
the significant duration of the foster family relationship; (2) the
State's termination of biological parents' parental rights; and
(3) the foster parents' "willingness and ability" to adopt the
child.68
A second line of cases has interpreted OFFER as
suggesting that a liberty interest can only arise, if at all, under
state law.6' Declining to analyze the possibility of a liberty
interest created under the Due Process Clause, these cases
demonstrate that the State's role in the foster family
determines not only the scope of the liberty interest, but also
the source. Kyees v. County Dep't of Pub. Welfare of Tippecanoe
County was one of the first cases to be decided subsequent to
the OFFER decision.8 In Kyees, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit ("Seventh Circuit") held that Illinois law did
not create a liberty interest "of constitutional magnitude" in
petitioner foster parents.69 The court in Kyees did acknowledge
that familial bonds form in non-biological families." The Kyees
decision, however, emphasized more strongly the Supreme
Court's statement that the foster family is an "arrangement" to
which the State is a party.71 The court quoted OFFER as saying
"it is appropriate (in determining the scope of the liberty
interests at stake) to ascertain from state law the expectations
See OFFER, 431 U.S. at 845.
See McLaughlin, 876 F.2d at 308; Rivera, 696 F.2d at 1024; Thelen, 691 F.
Supp. at 1186; Brown, 601 F. Supp. at 665.
Brown, 601 F. Supp. at 656.
See Rodriguez II, 214 F.3d at 337 (ruling that a liberty interest would exist
only under state law, and not under the Due Process Clause); Procopio, 994 F.2d at 330
(finding no procedural safeguards that override state's ultimate power to terminate
foster care arrangement); Wildauer, 993 F.2d at 373 (holding that foster parent did not
have legal custody of the foster children, therefore, foster parent did not have a liberty
interest); Kyees, 600 F.2d at 699 (ruling that foster parents had reason to believe that
the state agency reserved the right to terminate the relationship).
Kyees, 600 F.2d at 694.
Id. at 699.
"Id. at 698-99.
71 Id. at 698.
2002]
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and entitlements of the parties."72 Therefore, cases following
the reasoning in Kyees use the OFFER decision's endorsement
of state law analysis as the basis for denying a foster parent
due process protection."
C. Ambiguity in New York Statutes and Regulations
New York's statutory provisions and regulations
pertaining to foster care set out procedures to be followed with
respect to events such as a child's placement into a foster
family, removal from a foster home, and adoption by a foster
parent.74 However, the facts in Rodriguez can support two
vastly different interpretations of the policy underlying the
provisions. The first interpretation is that New York law
grants broad discretion to the custodial agency in determining
what is in the best interest of the child during the period in
which the child remains in the foster care system.75 The second
Id. (quoting OFFER, 431 U.S. at 846).
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
74 See N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 92 (McKinney Supp. 2000) (agency review of
foster care status); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 375 (McKinney 1992) (licensing of a foster
parent); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 376 (McKinney 1992) (placement of a child in a foster
home); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 377 (placement of a child in a foster home) (McKinney
1992); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 383(3) (McKinney 1992) (foster parents who have cared
for children for more than twelve months are permitted to intervene as an interested
party in any proceeding involving custody of the child); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384(5)
(McKinney 1992) (agency's placement of child in home with intention of adoption,
adoption procedure); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 400 (McKinney 1992) (removal of children
from foster care); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 421.1(c) (1999) (definition of
'adoptive placement", "adoptive parent", "authorized agency," "foster parent," and
"legal guardian"); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 421.2(b) (1999) (efforts to
remove child from care and custody of biological parent, adoptive parent, or legal
guardian only when it is clearly established that removal would be in child's best
interest; the rights of the child, biological parents, legal guardians, foster and adoptive
parents must be respected and protected through responsible agency action); N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 421.19 (1999) (procedures for adoption); N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 443.5 (1999) (removal of child from foster care).
75 See Brief for Municipal Appellants, supra note 14, at 24 (citing N.Y. SOC.
SERV. LAW § 383(2)). Essentially, this view points out (1) where the biological paren~s
rights are terminated, the agency retains legal custody over a foster child up until the
adoption procedure is complete, and therefore the agency may use discretion to
supervise the child's placement in the pre-adoptive home; and (2) since agencies are
not infallible, the law grants foster parents and pre-adoptive parents procedures with
which to challenge agency action, but these procedures do not constitute a rights-
creating scheme. Id. at 24-28 (describing the significance of legal custody, and
procedures available to foster parents in the event a child is removed).
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interpretation is that New York law promotes, above all, "the
healthy emotional development of children," which, in the
absence of biological parents, often involves foster parents
assuming a permanent role in a child's life.76 This view insists
that the law protects pre-adoptive foster families from agency
intervention when such intervention would disrupt the child's
bonding with his pre-adoptive parents.77
The different interpretations illustrate the difficulty
legislators experience when drafting legislation regarding
foster children. Legislators must enact laws to protect foster
children's health and safety. However, legislators face constant
pressure to improve the foster care system so as to provide
permanency (either through reunification with biological
parents or through adoption) to foster children in a timely
manner, so that they will not remain in the system for an
unnecessarily long period.7" These two goals come into conflict
because certain aspects of the law indicate a legislative
willingness to recognize the potential for foster families to
develop permanent bonds (leading to adoption), however,
legislators have thus far been unwilling to expressly curtail
76 In re Marie Jones, 74 Misc. 2d 821, 822, 346 N.Y.S.2d 16, 18 (N.Y. Farn. Ct.
1973) ("[Clhildren not only need homes where they will receive good physical care-
they also need homes where they can develop roots and ties and that sense of security
which comes from belonging to a family on a permanent basis.").
7In re Adoption of A, 158 Misc. 2d 760, 764, 601 N.Y.S.2d 762, 766 (N.Y. Fan.
Ct. 1993) (reasoning that pre-adoptive foster parents hold a special place in the
statutory scheme because they are "resourcels], [who are] ready, willing and qualified
to adopt a child, as well as anxious to do so").
Recently, state and local agencies received a federal mandate for promoting
permanency within the foster care system. On January 22, 1999, the Commissioner of
New York City's Administration for Children's Services ("ACS"), Nicholas Scoppetta,
announced the city's implementation of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
("ASFA"). See Letter From the Commissioner, COMMISSIONER'S BULLETIN, Jan. 22,
1999, at 1, available at http'J/www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/acs (last visited Apr. 8, 2002).
According to Mr. Scoppetta, ASFA aims to minimize the time children spend in foster
care. Id. For example, ASFA provides for a permanency hearing to be held in Family
Court twelve months after a child enters foster care and at twelve month intervals
after that. Id. At the hearing, the judge must determine whether and at what time the
child will either be returned to the birth parents, placed for adoption, or in another
planned permanent living situation. Id. Note, however, that the Second Circuit did not
refer to ASFA in Rodriguez. However, Ms. Rodriguez alleged in her appellate brief that
by January 21, 1992, the ACS (then known as the CWA) formerly changed Andrew's
"permanency planning goal" to adoption, deciding that it would not be in Andrew's best
interest to return to his biological mother. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 22, at 5.
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agency authority before the adoption is final.7' As a result, the
agency retains the power to terminate the relationship whether
it is an initial foster family placement or a pre-adoptive family
who has lived together for at least a year as a foster family.
Therefore, when a pre-adoptive foster parent like Ms.
Rodriguez argues that she should be guaranteed due process
protection when the authorized agency removes a foster child
from her home, she supports her argument with current
legislative policy that has found favor on the federal and local
level.8° However, the difficulty is in demonstrating that
permanency qualifies a pre-adoptive family for constitutional
protection. The Second Circuit's decision in Rodriguez adds
further fuel to the debate over -whether New York's child
welfare law should grant a liberty interest to pre-adoptive
foster parents.
II. ANALYSIS
In Rodriguez, the Second Circuit faced a newly-
developed legislative policy advocating permanency for foster
children and a sharply divided body of case law driven by the
Supreme Court decision in OFFER that both recognized the
79 A "health and safety" legislative purpose conflicts with a "permanency"
legislative purpose in a case like Rodriguez because the former promotes agency
intervention (keeping Andrew out of the home until the agency has decided whether
the environment is safe) while the latter defers more to the emotional attachment
between the pre-adoptive parent and the child (which, in Andrew's case would be
significant since Ms. Rodriguez is the only parent Andrew has ever truly known).8o The trend toward injecting "permanency" into the foster care system
involves recognizing that a long-term foster parent is often a good candidate for
adopting his or her foster child. Consider the agency's procedure for determining
whether a prospective adoptive parent would be the right permanent parent for a
particular child:
[close scrutiny is accorded to the degree of bonding between the pre-
adoptive parent(s) and child, the length of time the child has resided
in the home, the child's adjustment to the home, the integration of the
child into the pre-adoptive family unit, the responsiveness of the pre-
adoptive parent(s) to the child's needs great and small, and special
needs, if any. In addition, there is an in-depth investigation into such
issues as the constancy and quality of resources provided for the child,
be they emotional, medical, educational, physical, recreational,
cultural, as well as the pre-adoptive parent's capacity to nurture the
child.
In reAdoption of A, 158 Misc. 2d at 764, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 766.
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integrity of the foster family and questioned its state law
origins without ever deciding if a foster parent might, under
any circumstances, possess a liberty interest. The Rodriguez
court had the opportunity to reconcile the new trend in foster
care with the divergent case history. The court only succeeded,
however, in increasing the polarity of the issue. The court in
Rodriguez reached the proper result in finding that New York
law does not create a liberty interest. However, the court
neglected to adequately discuss the possibility of a liberty
interest in a pre-adoptive foster parent arising under the Due
Process Clause.8' In fact, the court dismissed the possibility of
such a liberty interest without significant explanation. Had the
court done such an analysis, it should have determined that
Andrew and Ms. Rodriguez possessed a liberty interest.82
Finally, the court should have addressed whether establishing
a liberty interest in a limited set of foster parents would
undercut the ability of child welfare agencies to protect
children within the foster care system.'
A. No Liberty Interest for Pre-Adoptive Foster Parents
Under New York Law
The court in Rodriguez applied the appropriate test and
correctly held that the New York statutory provisions do not
create a liberty interest in the protection of Ms. Rodriguez'
foster family. The existing statutory provisions do not contain
precise language that expressly elevates the pre-adoptive foster
parent to a parental status equivalent to an adoptive or
biological parent.' The provisions also do not explicitly instruct
"' While it recognized that "the Due Process Clause is the source of many
interfamilial rights, the court declined to extend this to the foster family." Webster v.
Ryan, 187 Misc. 2d 127, 134, 720 N.Y.S. 750, 755 (2001).
82 See supra Part I.B.
' See infra Part II.B.
New York statutory provisions do include the pre-adoptive foster parent in
the definition of "adoptive parent," however, the provision guaranteeing procedural
rights after removal only applies to "adoptive parents" having custody of the child. N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 421.1(c) (1999). Note that the Supreme Court in
OFFER suggested that finding a liberty interest in a foster parent "for purposes of the
procedural protections of the Due Process Clause would not necessarily require that
foster families be treated as fully equivalent to biological families for purposes of
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state officials to confer certain procedural rights upon a foster
parent following a child's removal from the home. In order to
establish a state-created liberty interest, the statutory
provision must contain mandatory language directing that
specific procedures be followed upon a particular state action
(such as removing a foster child).85 The current provisions do
not protect long-term foster families awaiting adoption
finalization against state intervention. The court's decision
sends a clear message to the New York legislature that the
statute should be amended in order to avoid the terrible impact
of this kind of separation between foster parent and child.86
1. Applying the Appropriate Test
The Supreme Court has held that a state creates a
liberty interest by providing: (1) specified substantive
predicates restricting official discretion; and (2) procedural
safeguards presented in "language of an unmistakably
mandatory character."' The first element requires that the
statute includes express conditions that must occur prior to a
state official depriving an individual of life, liberty, or
substantive due process review." OFFER, 431 U.S. at 842 n.48 (quoting Moore, 431
U.S. at 546-47 (White, J., dissenting)).
m See Kentucky Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462 (1989); Olim v.
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983).
m The CWA itself acknowledged the tragic consequences of McCloskey's denial
of post-removal visitation to Ms. Rodriguez, saying it was "very questionable since...
visiting could have helped the child's understanding of the situation." Rodriguez II, 214
F.3d at 341. The court in Rodriguez agreed that the legislature should get involved:
"Ensuring appropriate treatment by the private agencies that the City chooses to
authorize to administer foster care remains a matter for supervision by state and local
legislative and administrative bodies." Id.
Thompson, 490 U.S. at 462-63; Olim, 461 U.S. at 249; Hewitt, 459 U.S. at
471-72. In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995), the Supreme Court ruled
that the mere presence of mandatory language does not necessarily mean that a liberty
interest has been created. The Second Circuit in Rodriguez found the Court's holding
in Sandin to be limited to the context of due process for prisoners. Rodriguez II, 214
F.3d at 338-39. Thus, the court in Rodriguez found that the formula articulated by the
Court in Thompson and in the two prior cases was an accurate measure as to whether
a state-created liberty interest exists. Id. All four Supreme Court decisions concern
prison situations, however, it would seem that the court in Rodriguez drew the correct
conclusion that simply because the formula can be altered in a prison situation does
not mean it can be similarly changed in a foster care situation since the underlying
circumstances are so different.
[Vol. 67: 3
RODRIGUEZ v. McLOUGHLIN
property.ss For example, a statute applicable to a prison
situation might describe the threat of serious disturbance
inside the prison. 9 The second element must involve "specific
directives to the decision maker that if the regulations'
substantive predicates are present, a particular outcome must
follow, in order to create a liberty interest.""
In Rodriguez, the court ruled that the statutes did not
explicitly provide for certain procedures to be followed in the
event of an emergency removal of a foster child.9' The court
noted that although certain statutory sections do grant foster
parents procedural rights, New York law does not link those
rights to the emergency removal situation; i.e., the
"substantive predicate."92 Further, the court pointed out that
the sections indicating the State's preference for foster parents
in adoption proceedings do not translate into a liberty interest.
Once again, such statutory language clearly does not relate to
emergency removal cases.3 Even if the "preference" section did
apply in Rodriguez, the court ruled that encouraging a foster
parent to adopt a child presents no explicit directive to state
officials as to procedures to be followed after removing a child
from a foster home.'
However, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
("Third Circuit") held in McLaughlin v. Pernsley that
Pennsylvania law created a liberty interest in petitioner foster
parents.95 In McLaughlin, the foster parents claimed their due
process rights were violated when their foster child was
removed from their home without notice and the right to
as See, e.g., Thompson, 490 U.S. at 462.
&9ld.
RId. at 463.
91 Indeed, the court found that the statutory sections at issue contained
neither substantive predicates nor mandatory language instructing as to a certain




9Id. The court acknowledged appellee's contention that the statute included a
pre-adoptive parent in its definition of "adoptive parent." However, the court ruled that
since Andrew was still in state custody at the time of the removal, the regulation
controlling "removals of a child from a parent or guardian's 'care and custody did not
apply to Ms. Rodriguez. Id at 340-41.9s See McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 876 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1989).
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appeal.96 Pennsylvania law differs from New York law
regarding foster children in that "[the Pennsylvania] Code goes
considerably beyond providing simple procedural requirements
for state actors to follow when they make foster care relocation
decisions."97 While the Pennsylvania Code expressly indicates
that certain procedures be followed when a child is removed
from a foster home, New York law provides no such guarantee
for the foster parent. Certainly the definition of "adoptive
parent" includes pre-adoptive foster parents; however, the New
York legislature has not attached any procedural rights to that
definition in the event of an emergency removal of a foster
child." In order to explicitly establish a state-created liberty
interest for a foster parent, the statute must provide clear
procedures to be followed in the event a foster child is removed
from the home under emergency circumstances. The
"[Pennsylvania Code] uses language of an unmistakably
mandatory character requiring that certain procedures 'shall'
or 'must' be employed."99 Thus, in McLaughlin, the Third
Circuit found an explicit connection between the procedural
safeguards and the removal process present in the
Pennsylvania statute."' The Second Circuit in Rodriguez,
however, made an accurate assessment of New York law when
it determined that the relevant statutes and regulations did
not create a liberty interest.
2. Inadequate Statutory Changes
Recent changes in New York law seek "permanency" for
foster children. In New York, a permanency hearing must be
9 Id. The child was removed from petitioner foster parents' home allegedly on
the basis of race (the child was black and his foster parents were white). Id.
97 See McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1988), affd,
McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 876 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 1989).
98 As the court pointed out, the regulation concerning removal of children from
homes only applies to parents having custody of their children. Ms. Rodriguez did not
have custody of Andrew at the time of his removal from her home. See Rodriguez II,
214 F.3d at 332.
" Id. The New York statutes and regulations pertaining to foster care include
language such as "must" and "shall" but the language is found, for example, in the
provisions pertaining to notice to foster parents regarding any proceeding concerning
the foster child's adoption. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 392 (McKinney Supp. 2000).
'
00 McLaughlin, 693 F. Supp. at 326.
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held no later than twelve months after a child has been placed
in a foster home.'' At the hearing, the state endeavors to
determine the best possible permanent living situation for the
child.10 2 These changes in the law reveal a legislative initiative
to adjust the primary purpose of the foster care system from
being that of a "temporary" care program to one with a
"permanent" purpose. Unfortunately, the "permanency"
provisions present in both federal and state law do not suffice
to create a liberty interest. Having expressed the hope through
the establishment of a permanency hearing that more foster
children will escape the harsh uncertainties of the foster care
system, the New York legislature has not yet implemented a
provision that would clearly guarantee a foster parent due
process rights after a foster child's removal.
The New York legislature must decide whether
advocating a "permanency" policy within the foster care system
ought to include protecting foster parents and children at a
certain point in time before adoption. If the New York
legislature is committed to promoting a policy dedicated to
encouraging familial bonds between foster parents and
children, then it should consider revising the foster care
statutory provisions. The court in Rodriguez, expressing regret
that the law has not advanced to the point at which children
like Andrew no longer face traumatic removals from a long-
term foster family, correctly found that New York law creates
no liberty interest in the foster family. The outcome in
Rodriguez demonstrates the need for legislative action. The
legislature should amend the existing statutory provisions in
order to create a liberty interest for pre-adoptive foster
parents. Some legislators may disagree on whether foster
parents should possess a liberty interest in the care of their
foster children. Nevertheless, the tragic nature of Andrew's
situation is too compelling to be left alone."3
01 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 383(3) (McKinney 1992). See also supra note 78 and
accompanying text.
I0 d.
103 The court in Rodriguez was appalled by the agency's conduct, noting that
even the City" 'acknowledges that' if plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected liberty
interest, 'the hearing plaintiff received here was too long after the emergency removal
to satisfy procedural due process standards'... [the] post removal denial of visitation
[was] very questionable since neither Ms. Rodriguez nor... Andrew could obviously
have been prepared for their separation from each other and visiting could have helped
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3. The Southern District's Criteria For Establishing a
Liberty Interest
In Rodriguez, the Southern District of New York
suggested criteria for creating a liberty interest in only a
discretely identifiable set of foster parents. Foster parents
would have a liberty interest only when: (1) the biological
parents' rights have been terminated; (2) the foster parent has
cared for the child for more than twelve months since the
child's infancy; and (3) the foster parent has entered into an
adoptive placement agreement for the foster child. 04 The
amended provision would have to expressly link this set of
criteria to the emergency removal situation in order to protect
a child like Andrew.
The district court's list of factors would distinguish the
pre-adoptive foster parent from a foster parent who is a
temporary caregiver. Currently, New York law contains a
regulation that distinguishes a foster parent from a pre-
adoptive parent. 5  However, there is no language that
distinguishes pre-adoptive foster parents from other pre-
adoptive parents. If the relevant provisions contained language
that made a clear distinction between parents such as Ms.
Rodriguez and pre-adoptive parents who do not have an
already-established relationship with their children, a
statutorily-defined liberty interest could emerge. The Seventh
Circuit noted in Procopio v. Johnson that the concept of
permanency coming out of foster care is present in Illinois law.
However, if circumstances justify removal, procedural
safeguards are not available to the foster parent to override the
state's ultimate power to terminate. 6 Amending the law to
ensure protection of the foster family in removal cases would
not diminish the state's power to terminate the foster care
the child's understanding of the situation.' " The court added, "It is to be hoped that
[legislative and administrative] authorities will take appropriate steps to prevent the
recurrence of'judgmental errors such as this." Rodriguez II, 214 F.3d at 341.
'4 See id. (quoting Rodriguez I, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 199).
'05 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 421.1(c) (1999) (including "a
person with whom a child has been placed for adoption").
10 Procopio, 994 F.2d at 330.
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relationship, but instead, would ensure that the child receives
proper communication with the only parent he or she has ever
known.
B. Potential Liberty Interest Under the Due Process Clause
The Second Circuit's decision in Rodriguez is flawed
because it fails to adequately discuss the possibility of a liberty
interest in a foster parent arising under the Due Process
Clause. In OFFER, the "Supreme Court explained that.., a
liberty interest in the integrity and stability of a foster family
may be found based on the Due Process Clause itself ....
The Supreme Court also noted in OFFER that the foster family
originates from a contractual arrangement to which the state is
a party."8 Having suggested that determining the entitlements
and expectations available to foster families under state law
would be the proper analysis, the Court did not conclude that
state law was to be the only basis for a liberty interest."9 Thus,
in determining whether a liberty interest exists, a court should
consider two sources for a liberty interest: state law and the
Due Process Clause."0
The court in Rodriguez focused only on whether the
New York statutory provisions created a liberty interest, thus
misinterpreting the OFFER decision."' The court
misinterpreted the Supreme Court's decision in OFFER to
mean that only state law creates a liberty interest in a foster
family. Further, the court's brief discussion of the Adoption
Placement Agreement does not correctly characterize the
107 Brief for Appellees, supra note 22, at 56 (citing OFFER, 431 U.S. at 842).
"" "[W here... the claimed interest derives from a knowingly assumed
contractual relationship with the State, it is appropriate to ascertain from state law
the expectations and entitlements of the parties." Rodriguez II, 214 F.3d at 337
(quoting OFFER, 431 U.S. at 845-46). The court in Rodriguez took this reasoning to
mean that a foster parent would possess a liberty interest only under state law. Id. at
337-38. 109 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
110 Rodriguez II, 214 F.3d at 338 (quoting Thompson, 490 U.S. at 462 (quoting
Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983))). The court acknowledges that there are
two sources for a liberty interest and then proceeds to discuss only one of them because





relationship between Ms. Rodriguez and Andrew. The court
should have determined whether the relationship is "close
enough" to liberty interests already protected under the Due
Process Clause to be considered an element of liberty." In
declining to do so, the court neglected to consider that Ms.
Rodriguez and Andrew might represent a limited class of foster
families that deserve protection under the Due Process Clause
because they have moved away from the temporary stage of the
foster parent-child relationship toward a permanent family
unit.
1. Finding a Liberty Interest in the Due Process
Clause
There are two approaches available for determining
whether a foster family possesses a liberty interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The first approach (hereinafter
referred to as the "malleable tradition" test) requires deciding
whether a familial relationship is close enough to a
"traditional" relationship already protected under the Due
Process Clause."' This approach asserts that tradition is "as
malleable and as elusive as 'liberty' itself. . ." and suggests
"identify[ing] the point at which a tradition becomes firm
enough to be relevant to our definition of liberty and the
moment at which it becomes too obsolete to be relevant any
longer.""' The second approach argues that a family possesses
a liberty interest only if it has "been treated as a protected
family unit under the historic practices of our society .. .."'
Determining that a familial relationship is "close enough" to
families already protected under the Due Process Clause does
112 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 145 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The Supreme Court noted in OFFER that the test was whether "the
relation of foster parent to foster child [is] sufficiently akin to the concept of 'family'
recognized in our precedents to merit similar protection." OFFER, 431 U.S. at 842.
. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 137-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Supreme
Court had previously referred to a similar approach in the OFFER case wherein it
asked the question: "[I]s the relation of foster parent to foster child sufficiently akin to
the concept of 'family' recognized in our precedents to merit similar [constitutional]
protection?" OFFER, 431 U.S. at 842.
11 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 137-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 124 (plurality opinion).
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not establish a liberty interest."6 According to this approach,
tradition is a static concept under the Due Process Clause.
Having declined to address whether a substantive
liberty interest exists in a pre-adoptive foster family, the court
in Rodriguez nevertheless indicated its likely position on this
issue when it discussed the Adoptive Placement Agreement.
1 7
The court ruled that the Agreement did not signify that
adoption was a "foregone conclusion" and reiterated that
McCloskey retained custody over Andrew until his adoption.1
8
The court thus signified its adherence to the "traditional"
approach, under which the only familial relationships to which
the Due Process Clause affords protection are biological
families and adoptive families.'
If the Second Circuit indeed followed the "traditional"
approach, it made the wrong choice. Once again, the court
vastly misinterpreted the OFFER decision in its analysis of
pre-adoptive foster families. The OFFER court explicitly noted:
"[B]iological relationships are not [the] exclusive determination
of the existence of a family."'20 The Court recognized the
potential for intimate relationships to develop between foster
parent and child 2' and outlined a scenario nearly identical to
the instant case: where a child enters the foster care system as
an infant, lives for many years in the care of the same foster
parent, and never comes to know his biological parents." In
such a situation, the Court suggested, "the foster family should
hold the same place [as a natural family would] in the
emotional life of the foster child."' Thus, the Court inferred
that the "malleable tradition" test would be the appropriate
test for determining whether a foster family possesses a liberty
interest under the Due Process Clause. 4
116 Id.
:
7 See Rodriguez II, 214 F.3d at 341.
1Id.
119 See id.
120 OFFER, 431 U.S. at 843.
1 Id. at 845.2  Id. Andrew lived with Ms. Rodriguez since his biological mother abandoned
him at birth. He was four years old at the time the agency removed him from the foster
home. Andrew only visited his biological mother a handful of times and never truly got
to know her as a parent. The state terminated the biological mother's parental rights.
See Brief for Appellees, supra note 22, at 58.
2 OFFER, 431 U.S. at 844.
124 Id. at 842. The "malleable tradition" test focuses on the quality of the
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The court in Rodriguez should have used the "malleable
tradition" test to decide whether Ms. Rodriguez has a liberty
interest under the Due Process Clause. The test would have
required a comparison of the relationship between Ms.
Rodriguez and Andrew to that between a biological mother and
son."= The court should have confronted the threshold question
of what factors establish the constitutionally protected
biological family. The Supreme Court recently ruled that "the
parental liberty interest [is] a function, not simply of 'isolated
factors', such as biology... but of the broader.., interest in
family."128  Therefore, more than the mere aspect of the
biological tie between parent and child must be present to
create a liberty interest. The Court has repeatedly emphasized
that "emotional attachments," which emerge from "the
intimacy of daily association," elevate the familial unit to the
status of a sacred institution.
27
familial relationship, therefore, it would certainly advance notions of the best living
situation for the child, particularly in the absence of biological ties. A more difficult
analysis would involve the a long-term foster care relationship where the biological
parents rights have not been terminated and the biological parents seek to re-take the
primary care responsibilities for the child. If a liberty interest were limited to the long-
term foster parent only in situations in which the biological parents rights have been
terminated, an important question is what happens to other long-term foster parents
who are shut-out of the picture but whom might nevertheless expect to have
constitutional protection based on an intimate relationship of significant duration?
Perhaps this problem will occur less frequently since many states have adopted ASFA's
"permanency hearing," which determines the best permanent living situation for a
foster child who has been in foster care for more than twelve months. The debate over
whether the biological parent should remain in the child's life would be solved at an
early point in the foster care relationship, hopefully before there is the development of
strong emotional bonds.
Note that OFFER was decided before Michael H. The latter case involved a
plurality of the Court deciding in favor of the "traditional" approach. See Michael H.,
491 U.S. at 124. However, a vigorous dissent, led by Justice Brennan, spoke out in
favor of the "malleable tradition" test. Id. at 145 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125 The Supreme Court has long recognized that biological families have a
liberty interest in protecting the sanctity of the family. "[Tihe interests of parents in
their relationship with their children is sufficiently fundamental to come within the
finite class of liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . [flew
consequences of judicial action are so grave as the severance of natural family ties."
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. at 119 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 774, 787
(1982)). Therefore, it is necessary to compare the foster family in the Rodriguez case
with the biological family.
"' Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (2000) (quoting Michael H., 491 U.S. at
123 (1989)).
127 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983), (quoting OFFER, 431 U.S. at
844 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972))).
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In Lehr v. Robertson, an unmarried father filed a
petition to vacate the adoption order of his child by the child's
mother and her husband on the ground that it was obtained by
fraud and in violation of his constitutional rights.' s The
Supreme Court held that an unmarried father lacking
custodial, personal, or financial relationships with his child is
not entitled to notice of the child's adoption proceeding.' The
Court concluded that while "the relationship of love and duty
in a recognized family unit is an interest in liberty . . . the
existence or nonexistence of a substantial relationship between
parent and child is a relevant criterion in evaluating ... the
rights of the parent."130 A biological tie between parent and
child does not guarantee "equivalent constitutional protection"
without the parent's "full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood." 3'
Ms. Rodriguez argued that neither biological nor formal
legal ties are the touchstone of the family.' Rather, it is the
"enduring relationship" between parent and child that forms
the foundation for a liberty interest.13  The court in Rodriguez
should have looked at whether Ms. Rodriguez and Andrew's
relationship resembled the constitutionally-recognized familial
relationship. In the context of foster care, the appropriate
question, then, is: when does a familial relationship created by
a foster care agency and authorized by state law "come close" to
the familial relationship already protected under the Due
Process Clause?' T
The court in Rodriguez should have analyzed certain
factors in order to compare Andrew's pre-adoptive foster family
to the traditional family unit. Such factors might include: (1)
the presence of substantial psychological ties in the absence of
a biological parent; (2) the "permanency" of Andrew's foster
care relationship; and (3) the importance of Ms. Rodriguez'
entering into an Adoptive Placement Agreement with the state
,28 Id. at 249-50.
'29 Id. at 262.
'20 Id. at 258, 267.
13 Id. at 261.
132 Brief for Appellees, supra note 22, at 67.
"3 Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) ("Parental rights do not
spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and child. They
require relationships more enduring.").3 4See OFFER, 431 U.S. at 842.
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for the adoption of Andrew.135 Examining elements such as
these would have demonstrated that Andrew and Ms.
Rodriguez had established (at the time McCloskey removed
Andrew) an intimate, enduring relationship that, although
lacking biological ties, strongly resembled that of a traditional
family.1
36
a. Substantial Psychological Ties
The first factor, the existence of substantial
psychological ties, is crucial to raising the status of a foster
family close to that of a constitutionally protected family.137 In
Brown v. San Joaquin County, the plaintiff foster mother
sought monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief after the
state removed a foster child from her home.138 The District
Court for the Eastern District of California concluded that this
"foster parent-foster child relationship has precisely the same
form and content as a healthy biological parent-child
relationship."139 In reaching its conclusion, the Brown court
described "substantial psychological ties" as a product of the
foster parent becoming a "de-facto parent" to the foster child.4
A foster parent achieves the status of "de-facto parent" by
"assum[ing] the role of parent, raising the child in his [or her]
own home, [and] in time acquir[ing] an interest in the
'companionship, care, custody, and management' of that
child."' The court explained that once a foster child has these
"substantial psychological ties" to the parent, and the foster
1' See Brief for Appellees, supra note 22, at 59. See also JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET
AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 39 (The Free Press ed. 1979) (1973).
136 See Berhow v. Crow, 423 So.2d 371, 375 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). The
First District Court of Appeals of Florida noted that "as the nature of the foster
parent/child's 'familial relationship' becomes closer and stronger, so as to approach the
level of the relationship between natural parents and their offspring, so too do the
rights of foster parents to preserve that relationship." Id.
137 In a foster care situation "where all the psychological elements implied in a
parent-child relationship are present and functioning effectively ... [iut is a state of
affairs identical with a successful adoption in every sense except the legal sense." See
GOLDSTEIN ETAL., supra note 135, at 27.
'8 Brown v. County of San Joaquin, 601 F. Supp. 653, 656 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
"9 Id. at 665.
140 Id. at 660 (quoting In re Shannon's Estate, 218 Cal. 490 (1933)).
141 Id. at 660. The court noted that it is the "de facto" parental status
that renders the psychological ties "substantial."
[Vol. 67: 3
RODRIGUEZ v. McLOUGHLIN
parent is "willing and capable" of giving the child a safe and
permanent living environment, then the state's subsequent
removal of the child from the home without due process would
destroy a liberty interest.
42
Andrew and Ms. Rodriguez' relationship undoubtedly
developed "substantial psychological ties."' Andrew lived with
Ms. Rodriguez since his mother abandoned him, which was
immediately following his birth.'4 In fact, Andrew lived with
Ms. Rodriguez every day of his life until McCloskey removed
him. 5 Andrew's biological mother's parental rights were
terminated after McCloskey decided it would not be in
Andrew's best interest to return to her.4 6  McCloskey
acknowledged, "because Andrew had been with Ms. Rodriguez
since he was 13 days old, and because he was in preadoptive
placement [with Ms. Rodriguez], a bond had formed between
Ms. Rodriguez and Andrew... [and] separating the two for
4 Brown, 601 F. Supp. at 662. The court went on to emphasize that a young
child who has no ties to his natural family is not able to distinguish a foster care family
relationship from a biological family relationship.
"No one can caution an infant against loving the individual who
provides for all of his needs, physical and emotional; no one can
instruct the infant foster child that his foster parent is not his real or
natural parent; no one can diminish the infant foster child's feelings
toward his foster parent and cause them to be distinguished from the
feelings of an infant child to his natural parents."
Id. at 665 (citation omitted).
143 Biological ties between parent and child have "psychological effects" on the
parent because such ties provide them with "first right to the possession of the child."
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 135, at 16. On the contrary, the "physical realities of [a
child's] conception and birth are not the direct cause of [the child's] emotional
attachment." Id. at 17. Instead a psychological tie, i.e. a relationship with the parent
which "results from day-to-day attention to [the child's] needs for physical care,
nourishment, comfort, affection, and stimulation," is the source of attachment. Id. If a
biological parent sees to the child's needs and thus builds psychological ties to the child
on the basis of the biological attachment, then the biological parent "will become [the
child's] 'psychological parent' in whose care the child can feel valued... [otherwise the]
biological parent will ... tend to become, a stranger" to the child, as was the situation
in Rodriguez. Id In Rodriguez, however, Ms. Rodriguez became Andrew's psychological
parent, having cared for him nearly all four years of his life. See Brief for Appellees,
supra note 22, at 6. Andrew's biological mother, having abandoned Andrew at the
hospital following his birth, became a stranger to Andrew. See id.





even a month would be harmful to Andrew. " 147 Therefore, since
Ms. Rodriguez cared for Andrew for four consecutive years and
because she is indistinguishable in Andrew's eyes from a
natural parent, Ms. Rodriguez is a "de-facto parent."148 The
court ought to have considered the substantial psychological
ties between Ms. Rodriguez and Andrew.
Nonetheless, had the Rodriguez court done such an
analysis, it still might have concluded that psychological ties
are not sufficient to establish the "integrity of the family
unit."'49 In Procopio, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff
foster parents did not possess a liberty interest. The court in
Procopio ruled that a foster parent is fundamentally different
from a biological parent because the foster parent does not
have legal custody of the foster child and the state retains the
power to terminate the foster care relationship. 5 o
In Procopio, the Seventh Circuit refused to widen the
scope of due process protection to include pre-adoptive foster
parents.' The court in Procopio, however, recognized that the
Due Process Clause is a possible source for a liberty interest in
147 Id. In their brief, appellees also cited McCloskey's finding that "such
a separation would cause feelings of abandonment and confusion in Andrew, which
could affect his emotional well-being for years to come." Id.
148 See Brown, 601 F. Supp. at 660.
149 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). In Stanley, the Supreme
Court noted that the Due Process Clause protects the "integrity of the family unit," and
that the right to have a family and raise children is one of the basic civil rights more
important, even, than property rights. Id.1 O Procopio, 994 F.2d at 328. The brief for the Cross-Claimants-Appellants
(McCloskey) emphasized the Procopio case quite heavily in pointing out that the
"comparison" test for finding a substantive liberty interest is inapplicable in a foster
parent case since the state retains custody of the foster child. Such a distinction would
render a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause unreachable until the foster
parent adopts the child. See Brief for Cross-Claimants-Appellants at 17, Rodriguez v.
McLoughlin, 214 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 2000) (No. 99-7020).
1s In Procopio, the Seventh Circuit reached a result similar to the Second
Circuit's decision in Rodriguez. Procopio, 994 F.2d at 330. However, the circuits are
divided on the issue of whether a pre-adoptive foster parent may possess a liberty
interest. See supra notes 54-73 and accompanying text. The circuits split centers on the
uncertainty stemming from the OFFER decision as to the Supreme Court's stance on
whether foster parents may, at any stage up until adoption possess a liberty interest in
the preservation of the family. Id. The federal courts seem to have difficulty deciding
how to reconcile the traditional discretion afforded to agencies in supervising foster
children with the unique status held by long-term foster parents who then become pre-
adoptive parents. See infra Part II.B.1.c.
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a foster family.152 Acknowledging that the Due Process Clause
is a possible source for a liberty interest in a foster parent, the
Seventh Circuit noted the Supreme Court's position as of the
OFFER decision: the "[Supreme] Court has stopped short of
deciding that foster family arrangements achieve the status of
a liberty interest that states cannot disrupt without due
process."5 ' Thus, in contrast to the Second Circuit in
Rodriguez, the Seventh Circuit conceded that there are two
sources of liberty interest in a foster parent. However, although
the Seventh Circuit considered the existence of a substantive
liberty interest, it opted to protect the traditional deference
given to the state's supervisory role in the foster family
relationship. Both the Second and Seventh Circuits should
have discussed possible factors pointing toward a substantive
liberty interest.'r4
b. The "Permanency" of the Foster Care Relationship
The second factor the Rodriguez court should have used
to compare Andrew's pre-adoptive foster family to the
traditional family unit was whether Andrew's foster family
could have reasonably expected that their relationship would
be permanent. If the foster family's expectation that the
relationship is permanent finds substantial support, from state
law or otherwise, then a court might conclude that the foster
family has become a "family" entitled to a liberty interest
arising under the Due Process Clause.'55 The court in
Rodriguez should have first addressed the importance of a
152 See Procopio, 994 F.2d at 330. The Seventh Circuit ultimately abandoned
the substantive liberty interest discussion based on its conclusion that foster parents
are fundamentally different from biological parents because the state has the power to
terminate a foster family arrangement. The court ruled that "the scope of the liberty
interest at stake... is appropriately ascertained from ., state law." Id. at 328.
163 Procopio, 994 F.2d at 328.
'" Recall that the Supreme Court in OFFER did not rule out the possibility of
a liberty interest arising from the Due Process Clause. See supra note 107 and
accompanying text. The existence of "psychological ties" is just one of several factors
that establish a substantive liberty interest. Simply because the legal custody of the
child remains with the state or authorized agency does not mean that the foster family
is fundamentally different from a constitutionally-protected family. See id.
155 Brief for Appellees, supra note 22 at 59.
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foster care relationship that is clearly not temporary.15 6 The
Supreme Court has held that the termination of a biological
parent's rights is "irretrievabl[y] destructi[ye] of the most
fundamental family relationship" and requires the state to
show clear and convincing evidence that the biological parent
is unfit to raise the child. 157 Thus, terminating biological
parents' rights renders the role of the pre-adoptive foster
parent quite significant.1 8
The Supreme Court in OFFER did not find a liberty
interest partly because the plaintiff foster families were based
on temporary relationships.'59 The foster parents in OFFER
were not in what could be characterized as permanent
relationships with foster children since the biological parents'
rights had not yet been terminated. 16 The Court refused to
decide on a liberty interest for the foster parents in that case,
noting that it risked severe derogation of the natural parents'
rights.
61
Lower courts have suggested other methods for
measuring the permanency of a foster family and the Second
Circuit could have followed one of these approaches, if not the
Southern District's. "' 2 In Sherrard v. Owens, the District Court
for the Western District of Michigan held that petitioner foster
parents did not possess a liberty interest because they had "no
reasonable expectation" that their relationship would become
16 An example would be a situation in which the child's biological parents'
rights have been terminated and the foster parent becomes the child's pre-adoptive
parent. See Rodriguez II, 214 F.3d 328.
... M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 104 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
753 (1982)).
8 See Lipscomb, 884 F.2d at 1249.
" OFFER, 431 U.S. at 846.
160 Id. The Court noted that affording a liberty interest to the foster parent
would almost certainly derogate from the natural parent's liberty interest. The
"tension" intrinsic in such an action, would be "unavoidable." Id. The Court seemed to
imply that it would be feasible for a foster parent to possess a liberty interest in
"family-like associations," but that the foster parent's eligibility for a liberty interest
changes dramatically when a biological parent remains in the picture: "It is quite
another [matter] to say that one may acquire... another's constitutionally recognized
liberty interest that derives from blood relationship, state law sanction, and basic
human right an interest the foster parent has recognized by contract from the outset."
Id.
161 Id.
"' See Rodriguez I, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 199.
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permanent.163 The foster parents in the Sherrard case had a
"provisional" foster care license.'" The license was valid only
for a six-month period and could not be issued more than four
times for the same foster child." The court in Sherrard
analyzed the following factors, which resulted in the conclusion
that the foster parents could not have perceived the
relationship as permanent: (1) the children were not infants at
the time they entered the foster home; (2) the children knew
other "parents" aside from the Sherrards; and (3) the children
lived in the Sherrard home for only one year.1
66
In contrast to the Sherrard case, Ms. Rodriguez is the
only "parent" Andrew has ever known.'67 Ms. Rodriguez began
caring for Andrew just thirteen days after he was born. Andrew
had only limited contact with his biological mother, and
McCloskey subsequently determined that it would not be in
Andrew's best interest to return to her.6 ' At that time, Andrew
was only two years old. 169 McCloskey further noted that
Andrew and Ms. Rodriguez shared a "close loving relationship,"
that Ms. Rodriguez "showed an enormous amount of love for
Andrew," and that Andrew called Ms. Rodriguez "Mommy."'
McCloskey and the CWA subsequently changed Andrew's
permanency planning goal from "discharge to adoption" and
designated Ms. Rodriguez' home as Andrew's "pre-adoptive
home."' Ms. Rodriguez then began proceedings to adopt
Andrew. 172 When the foster parent and child have established a
long-standing and loving relationship, which has been
recognized by the state as a pre-adoptive family, then the
familial relationship has arrived at a level close to that of an
adoptive or biological family.
"
3 Sherrard v. Owens, 484 F. Supp. 728, 741 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
164 id.
"s Id. The provisional license therefore, does not carry the same duration and
effect as a "valid state foster home license," according to the court in Sherrard. Id.
" Id. at 742.




171 Id. at 5.
17 It is important to note that the foster parent has preference in adoption




Had the court in Rodriguez considered the permanency
issue, however, it might have concluded that despite
indications of "closeness" between foster parent and foster child
and despite the biological parent's absence, the contractual
nature of the relationship precludes any expectations. In the
case of Drummond v. Fulton County, the petitioner foster
parents had cared for a two-and-a-half-year-old boy since he
was only a month old.173 The biological mother's rights were
terminated and the child became eligible for adoption.Y The
agency denied the foster parents' adoption petition and the
foster parents subsequently filed suit to enjoin the child's
removal from their home."5 The Georgia Supreme Court held
that the foster parents possessed no liberty interest.176 Having
acknowledged that the Drummonds were, in fact, the child's
"psychological parents," the court nevertheless concluded that
the Fulton County Department of Family and Children
Services had "all the legal rights of a natural parent" since it
retained legal custody of the child.
77
The Drummond case presents facts nearly identical to
the Rodriguez case. In Rodriguez, however, Ms. Rodriguez had
not been denied in her application to adopt Andrew. In fact, all
parties to the case acknowledged or did not dispute Ms.
Rodriguez' claim that the adoption process was in the final
stages when removal took place. 7  The Drummonds'
'73 Drummond v. Fulton County, 228 S.E.2d 839 (Ga. 1976).
174 Id. at 845.
17 1 Id. at 841.
176 Id. at 454. This case is frequently cited and represents perhaps the
strongest voice against the existence of a liberty interest in foster parents. Note that
the Supreme Court decided OFFER the very next year and opted not to rule on
whether foster parents possess a liberty interest. Courts interpreting OFFER as
leaning against finding a substantive liberty interest in foster parents typically cite to
Drummond. See Procopio, 994 F.2d at 330. However, although the Supreme Court left
open the liberty interest question in OFFER, it did suggest that a long-term foster
parent holds the same place in the emotional life of a child who has never known his or
her biological parents. See OFFER, 431 U.S. at 844.
177 Drummond, 228 S.E.2d at 846.
178 See Brief for Cross-Claimants-Appellants, supra note 150, at 9 (agreeing
that only finalization was needed, but disputing that finalization would not have been
possible before the date Andrew was removed); Brief for Municipal Appellants, supra
note 14, at 13 (not disputing that Andrew's adoption was close to completion at the
time of his removal, but acknowledging only that Ms. Rodriguez and McCloskey had
entered into an Adoption Placement Agreement); Brief for Appellees, supra note 22, at
7-8 (alleging that had McCloskey met New York City's adoption procedures, Andrew's
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expectations as to the continuity of their foster family do not
approach the expectations Andrew and his foster mother had
with respect to making their relationship permanent. The
Drummonds knew that they were not included in the agency's
future plans for their foster child when their petition for
adoption was denied. Ms. Rodriguez and Andrew expected that
their relationship would be a permanent one since the adoption
neared completion.
c. The Importance of Entering into an Adoptive
Placement Agreement
The Rodriguez court did discuss the Adoptive Placement
Agreement (the "Agreement") as possible evidence of a liberty
interest in Ms. Rodriguez' foster family.' The court found,
however, that the Agreement specifically stated that the state
possessed legal custody of Andrew until the adoption's
finalization.8 ' The court cited several excerpts from the
Agreement including the provision that in the event the agency
decides to remove Andrew from the home, Ms. Rodriguez would
cooperate with the agency in a manner that promotes Andrew's
best interest (to be determined by the agency). 8' The court
concluded that the Agreement did not augment the state law
provisions so as to create a liberty interest.'82
The court should have considered the Agreement as a
factor for determining whether the foster family possessed a
liberty interest arising under the Due Process Clause. The
Agreement is significant because it is itself representative of
the foster family's metamorphosis during the adoption process
from a temporary care unit to a loving and nurturing family
possessing the same fundamental integrity as a natural
adoption would have been final six weeks prior to Andrew's removal).
1 See Rodriguez II, 214 F.3d at 341. The court discussed this agreement in
the context of a possible state-created liberty interest; however, it also should have
been part of a discussion as to whether the foster care relationship has developed to a
point at which it closely resembles a "family" protected under the Due Process Clause.
See Rodriguez I, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 196-97.




family." When Ms. Rodriguez entered into the Agreement she
became a "pre-adoptive" parent. A pre-adoptive parent is
included in New York's definition of an "adoptive parent."""
While the court correctly determined that the inclusion of Ms.
Rodriguez as an adoptive parent would not give rise to a state-
created liberty interest, it neglected to note the importance of
the title as it pertains to a possible liberty interest arising
under the Constitution. The court should have discussed the
Agreement's significance as it pertained to the nature of Ms.
Rodriguez' parental status.
Having determined in the OFFER case that a foster
family does not traditionally reach "the 'private realm of family
life that the state cannot enter'," the Supreme Court seemed to
leave open the possibility that a pre-adoptive foster family
might be included.8 ' Some lower federal courts have recognized
the important distinction between foster parent and pre-
adoptive parent. For example, in Thelen v. Catholic Social
Services, the District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin distinguished foster parents from prospective
adoptive parents, concluding: "Unlike foster parents, the
prospective adoptive parents cannot be said to expect that their
relationship with the child will be ended.""6 The court in
Thelen pointed out that in OFFER, plaintiff foster parents
should have had substantial doubt that their foster children
would remain with them forever.'87 However, the court in
Thelen ruled that a pre-adoptive parent validly expects a
permanent relationship despite the fact that the state retains
legal guardianship until adoption.
188
'8 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
8 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
18 See OFFER, 431 U.S. at 842-44. The Court recognized the interdependent
relationship that can develop- between a foster parent and child in a long-term foster
care arrangement, therefore perhaps the Court might accept the "permanent
expectations" of pre-adoptive foster parents as legitimate. Id. at 844.
18 Thelen, 691 F. Supp. at 1184. The Thelens had fulfilled all of the state
requirements for consideration as prospective adoptive parents. Id. The Thelens then
entered into an Adoptive Parents' Agreement and the agency placed a child in their
home. Id. The child was subsequently removed and the placement terminated. Id. at
1181.
11 Id. at 1184.
"a Thelen, 691 F. Supp. at 1185.
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In addition, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
acknowledged the significant difference between a pre-adoptive
agreement and a foster care placement arrangement in
Spielman v. Hildebrand.'89  According to the court, a
"preadoption agreement ... represents an attempt to find a
permanent, stable home for children [while] [fWoster care
agreements, in contrast, typically involve temporary care
during a transitional period of a child's life."9 ' Although the
court in Spielman reached a result similar to the OFFER case
because it opted not to decide whether the Spielmans had a
liberty interest arising under the Due Process Clause,
Spielman nevertheless demonstrates that a pre-adoptive
parent is at least eligible for a limited liberty interest upon the
consideration of other factors in that circuit.' 9'
The court in Rodriguez should have included the
Agreement as a factor in a discussion of a constitutional liberty
interest. The Agreement raises Ms. Rodriguez from the
category of foster parent to a pre-adoptive parent. Such a
change in status is notable because it elevates Ms. Rodriguez'
already substantial expectation that her relationship with
Andrew will become permanent.'92  The Agreement
18 873 F.2d 1377, 1385 (10th Cir. 1989). Note the court in Spielman concluded
that the pre-adoption agreement "may have given the Spielmans a reasonable
expectation of developing a permanent relationship with the child that rises to a
liberty interest meriting limited due process protection." Id. The court, however,
assumed, "without deciding", that the state did not deprive the Spielmans of due
process because the Spielmans received a fair hearing. Id.
" Id. at 1384.
191 The Second Circuit in Rodriguez views the pre-adoptive parent in a
different light than the Tenth Circuit in Spielman. See Rodriguez II, 214 F.3d at 341.
According to the Second Circuit, the pre-adoptive parent can never be eligible for a
liberty interest, regardless of any expectation of permanence, because the agency
retains legal custody of the child until the adoption is final. Id. Nevertheless, the
Second Circuit should have at least considered that OFFER suggested that foster
families have the potential to form bonds comparable to a constitutionally-protected
family. Note that McCloskey in its appellate brief criticized the district court for
mischaracterizing the Spielman case, since the court in Spielman clearly stated that
"pre-adoptive parents have not yet attained the status of adoptive parents, who, like
natural parents, have a protected liberty interest...." See Brief for Cross-Claimants-
Appellants, supra note 150, at 28. However, the court in Spielman went on in the next
sentence to acknowledge that "[oin the other hand, the status of pre-adoption may be
viewed as conferring a more significant relationship than foster care because of the
possibility of developing a permanent adoptive relationship." 873 F.2d 1384.
Andrew's perspective is also important. Though only four-years-old at the
time McCloskey removed him, the agency's own reports indicated that Andrew called
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demonstrates that the parties have agreed that Ms. Rodriguez
is the parent who will provide Andrew's best living situation.193
All agency reports characterize Andrew and Ms. Rodriguez'
relationship as "loving"; the Agreement puts in writing the
culmination of a family's development in accordance with
agency approval."'4 While the agency retains legal custody of
Andrew, the Agreement nevertheless demonstrates that
Andrew's foster family is comparable to that of an adoptive
family.
The court in Rodriguez insisted that because Andrew's
custody remained with the state, no liberty interest existed. 95
This conclusion is consistent with a number of cases decided
since the OFFER case.1 96 Nevertheless, the court should have
at least included the Agreement as one factor in assessing
whether the foster family rises to the level of a family
recognized as possessing a liberty interest under the Due
Process Clause. The court did not analyze any factors lending
support to a constitution-based liberty interest. Including the
Agreement as part of a state-created liberty interest discussion
does not preclude the court from also viewing the Agreement as
possibly creating a Fourteenth Amendment-created liberty
interest.
The three factors discussed above should have been duly
taken into account by the court in the Rodriguez case: (1) the
substantive psychological ties between Andrew and his foster
mother; (2) indications of the relationship's permanency; and
(3) the Agreement as it pertains to the difference between
foster parent and pre-adoptive parent. If the court had done
Ms. Rodriguez "Mommy" and had come to rely on her care and emotional support. See
Brief for Appellees, supra note 22, at 5-6.
193 See supra note 80 (discussing the procedure that determines whether a
foster parent would be a suitable adoptive parent). See also Brief for Appellees, supra
note 22, at 35 (comparing a pre-adoption agreement to a foster care placement
agreement).
194 Id.
195 Rodriguez II, 214 F.3d at 341.
'96 See Rodriguez II, 214 F.3d at 337 (ruling that a liberty interest would exist
only under state law, and not under the Due Process Clause); Procopio, 994 F.2d at 330
(finding no procedural safeguards that override state's ultimate power to terminate
foster care arrangement); Wildauer, 993 F.2d at 373 (holding that foster parent did not
have legal custody of the foster children, therefore, foster parent did not have a liberty
interest); Kyees, 600 F.2d at 699 (ruling that foster parents had reason to believe that
the state agency reserved the right to terminate the relationship).
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this analysis, it would have concluded that Ms. Rodriguez and
Andrew had a liberty interest in the preservation of their
family at the time when McCloskey removed Andrew from the
foster home.
Had the court reached such a conclusion, it should then
have discussed whether significantly delaying Ms. Rodriguez'
access to a fair hearing and visitation rights constituted due
process violations. The court in Rodriguez has already
acknowledged that the agency's actions were "judgmental
error." However, in ruling that Ms. Rodriguez' foster family did
not possess a liberty interest, the court made it possible for the
agency to repeat such conduct in the future. The court erred in
failing to adequately address the issue of whether Ms.
Rodriguez and Andrew possessed a liberty interest under the
Due Process Clause. In doing so, the court misinterpreted the
OFFER decision and undermined the potential for New York's
foster families to maintain emotional bonds.
2. Effect of Finding a Liberty Interest
The appellants in Rodriguez objected to the district
court finding a liberty interest in a limited set of foster
parents.'97  The underlying theme supporting appellants'
objection constitutes a significant concern that expanding the
constitutional guarantee protecting familial privacy would
prevent custodial agencies from protecting foster children who
are living in an abusive foster home. 9 ' Such concern widens the
split between circuit courts in the years following OFFER
because while some courts have relied on the elements in
OFFER that recognize the potential for permanency within a
foster family, others have held fast to such clauses from
OFFER as: "whatever emotional ties . . . develop between
foster parent and foster child have their origins in an
arrangement where the State has been a partner from the
197 See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
198 Preventing the agency (either a state agency such as ACS in New York
City, or an agency authorized by the state to place children in foster homes and to
facilitate adoptions, such as McCloskey) from protecting a child's health and safety
would put foster children at risk and draw more foster parents into court to fight




outset."199 In other words, the battle comes down to balancing
the significance of the "psychological" family against broad
agency discretion.
Finding a liberty interest in pre-adoptive foster parents
would not prevent agencies and, hence, the state from
protecting foster children. First, new "permanency" provisions
in New York law shorten the amount of time children stay in
foster care.2" Already, studies conducted on New York City's
foster care system show a decline in the number of children in
the system.2' These kinds of results demonstrate that children
are moving more quickly from the temporary, uncertain status
of foster care toward a permanent family situation. Fewer
children will find themselves in Andrew's situation, remaining
in foster care for a four-year period and enduring a long
adoption finalization process only to be abruptly removed and
denied visitation with the woman who served as his parent for
all his life. Foster parents will achieve pre-adoptive parent
status at an earlier stage than Ms. Rodriguez did, but the state
will still have the opportunity to ensure that permanent
placement in the foster parent's home would be in the child's
best interests. Therefore, foster families will achieve adoption
finalization in a more efficient manner, which will hopefully
avoid further occurrences like Andrew's removal. However, a
liberty interest in limited situations such as Andrew's is still
necessary. It will not disrupt the permanency procedures
outlined above.
" OFFER, 431 U.S. at 845. See Rodriguez II, 214 F.3d at 337 (ruling that a
liberty interest would exist only under state law, and not under the Due Process
Clause); Procopio, 994 F.2d at 330 (finding no procedural safeguards that override
state's ultimate power to terminate foster care arrangement); Wildauer, 993 F.2d at
373 (holding that foster parent did not have legal custody of the foster children,
therefore, foster parent did not have a liberty interest); Kyees, 600 F.2d at 699 (ruling
that foster parents had reason to believe that the state agency reserved the right to
terminate the relationship).200 See supra note 78.
20 A press release from ACS in December of 2000 reports that the foster care
population in New York City has dropped eighteen percent over the past two years. See
Press Release, Administration for Children's Services, Child Welfare Advisory Panel
Final Report Finds ACS has Made "Remarkable Progress" (Dec. 8, 2000), available at
http'J/www.ci.nyc.us/html/acs (last visited Apr. 8, 2002).
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Second, opponents of a liberty interest in pre-adoptive
parents argue that the Rodriguez ruling:
[Cireates a legal twilight zone where there is doubt about child care
agencies' ability to make other important decisions not involving
custody... as legal guardians agencies are often [required] to make
such judgments and... preadoptive parents asserting parent-type
liberty interests will claim some right to control or participate in
that process.
202
Defenders of the District Court's decision insist that the claim
asserted in Rodriguez was a procedural due process claim, not
a substantive due process claim.23 The former asserts that Ms.
Rodriguez and Andrew "had a liberty interest in the integrity
and stability of their preadoptive foster family relationship,
which could not be violated without adequate procedural due
process."2 ' The latter would question the state's fundamental
right to regulate foster families. 20 5 A liberty interest in Ms.
Rodriguez and Andrew's relationship would guarantee them a
prompt fair hearing and visitation rights following the
custodial agency's removal of Andrew; it would not prevent the
agency from removing Andrew upon an agency official's
determination that Andrew's safety was in jeopardy.
CONCLUSION
The Rodriguez case presents two important challenges.
First, the court's holding that the current New York statutory
provisions do not give rise to a liberty interest should challenge
the legislature to decide if the policy of "permanency" already
added into the statute should also be added to emergency
removal procedure provisions and include the pre-adoptive
foster parent. The legislature should think about the
consequences of carving out a limited class of foster parents for
202 Brief for Municipal Appellants, supra note 14, at 30 (citing In re Hasani B.,
195 A.D.2d 404, 600 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1993)).2
'
3 Ms. Rodriguez argued she deserved a constitutional guarantee of pro-
cedural protection after the state broke apart her long-term "family". She was not
arguing that the state had no right to interfere with her family life before the adoption





due process protection. In addition, the legislature should
decide whether such a change would benefit foster children or
whether foster parents would wield too much parental status
prior to adoption. Second, the court's failure to give significant
consideration to the possibility of a liberty interest arising
under the Due Process Clause presents a challenge to future
courts to reconsider the Supreme Court's decision in the
OFFER case. Future courts should not limit the liberty interest
analysis to state law. A liberty interest in the foster care
scenario can be found either in state law or in the Due Process
Clause itself. Finding a liberty interest under the Due Process
Clause does not alter the state-created nature of the foster
family. Rather, such a liberty interest would recognize that the
foster parent and child have moved beyond their contractual
origins and developed in some cases into a family sufficiently
close to the biological family to qualify for some degree of due
process protection.
A family like the one in the instant case, an emotionally
bonded foster mother and child awaiting final approval for
adoption, certainly should not be broken apart without
protecting the bonds that have formed during the relationship's
development. In order to avoid this "judgmental error" in the
future, the courts and the legislature should expand the
traditional definition of a family.
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